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I.

ISSUES

The Court is asked to consider several questions under the free review standard.

I

These

questions come in three main categories.
The first category of issues is mootness. This Court must decide whether this case is
moot, and if so, whether this case fits in any exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
The second category is whether, in what ways, and to what extent the District Court erred
as a matter of law. This Court must determine whether the District Court correctly interpreted
and applied Idaho Code (hereinafter "I.C.") § 9-335 when it determined that investigatory
records in the prosecutor's possession, pending a charging decision, should be disclosed. See

Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 789 (2003). This Court must determine whether law
enforcement agencies, in possession of investigatory records under prosecutorial review, must
have absolute certainty that disclosure of those records would "interfere with enforcement
proceedings" or "deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication" to justify
exemption of such records from disclosure? This Court must decide whether the District Court
correctly recognized the objective standard of review that must be made prior to disclosure under
I.C. § 9-338, as well as whether the District Court correctly interpreted I.C. § 9-344 when it
applied a subjective standard of review to Mr. Wade's petition.

I Despite Mr. Wade's failure to address the applicable standard of review to decisions on issues of fact by the lower
court, the County recognizes a clear error standard applies to issues offact decided by the District Court. When
reviewing a discretionary decision, this Court determines "( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008).
In the Gibson case, the Court suggested that an insufficient record hampered their ability to properly review the
lower Court's decision. In an abundance of caution, Appellant submitted the documents to be reviewed by the Court
in camera.
2 The County has been using the terms "prosecutorial review" and "investigation" by the prosecutor
interchangeably. For purposes of clarity in this Reply Brief, the County will refer to the screening, deliberating,
conducting additional investigation, and making of charging decisions for cases as "prosecutorial review."
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The final category pertains to attorney fees in the context of public records litigation.
Included in this section are the questions of what attorney fee statute applies and whether the
County frivolously pursued this appeal.
II.

ST ANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in a public records case is free review for questions of law.

Gibson, 138 Idaho at 789. Mr. Wade, the Respondent, agrees with this standard in his Reply
Brief:
As the issue is jurisdictional, the Court exercises free review in making its
decision as to whether an issue is moot. .. See Arambarri v. Armstrong 152 Idaho
734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Idaho, 2012).
(Resp. Brief., p. 6).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free
review. Magic Valley Newsps., Inc., 138 Idaho at 144, 59, P.3d at 315 (citing
Lopez v. State, Indus. Spec, Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)).
(Resp. Brief., p. 13).
The standard of review in a case of statutory interpretation has been well settled:
This Court exercises free review over question of law, including the interpretation
of a statute. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143
Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006).
(Resp. Brief., p. 16). As such, this Court may exercise free review over the District Court's
decision, as well as examine the investigatory records provided in the County's Motion to
Augment.
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

MOOTNESS
The first issue the Court must decide is whether this case is moot, and if so, whether this

case fits in any exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Not only is this case not moot, but this case
fits in three, possibly even four, exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
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1.

This Case Is Not Moot Because the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office Did Not Provide Mr. Wade With the Requested Documents.

A case is moot when the Court's ruling in the case will not have any impact or settle any
current issue or problem. The Court recently declared that an issue is moot when "it does not
present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial
decree of specific relief." Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 848 (2012), citing
AmerUel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849 (2005). The Court has
provided various metrics with which to determine mootness, such as when "the issues presented
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome," Bradshaw v.
State, 120 Idaho 429, 432 (1991), or when the issue "presents no justiciable controversy and a
judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." Idaho County Property
Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Syringa Gen. Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309, 315 (1991); Idaho Sch. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity By & Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd of Educ. By & Through
Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 281 (1996).
The imprecise language of Mr. Wade's brief leads to the erroneous conclusion that the
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (hereinafter "the County") produced the
documents requested by Mr. Wade. Specifically, Mr. Wade's brief states the following:
The only cognizable legal interest that the County had in the present appeal is the
non-disclosure of the investigatory records that they claimed were exempt. Once
those documents were voluntarily released through discovery and by order of the
Federal District Court through a subpoena, the County had no other cognizable
legal interest.
(Resp. Brief, pp. 8-9). (Emphasis added). What Mr. Wade's brief fails to clarify is that the
Federal District Court specifically did not order the County to tum over the investigatory
records:
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These three binders comprised the documents sought by the public records
request, and constituted documents responsive to the requests for the Idaho State
Police, Payette, and Fruitland investigative files. . . If this Court ordered
compliance with the Rule 45 subpoena with respect to the three binders, it would
nullify Judge Ryan's order and allow Wade to circumvent the stay ... Based upon
the Court's analysis above, the Court will grant Canyon County's motion to quash
the subpoena corresponding to items one, two, and three of the subpoena.

Wade v. City afFruitland, 1:12-CV-00465-CWD, 2013 WL 149484, at *4-*6 (D. Idaho Jan. 14,
2013). The Federal District Court recognized the importance of denying Mr. Wade's request for
the investigatory records. Mr. Wade's argument is therefore misplaced to the extent that it
suggests the Federal District Court's order moots the issues before this Court. Quite to the
contrary, the Federal District Court carefully distinguished documents covered by Mr. Wade's
public records request and those subject to disclosure by subpoena. ("The public records request
did not ask for Canyon County's investigative file, but the Rule 45 subpoena did." Id. at 11.)
The County has never provided Mr. Wade with the investigatory records for this case,
and thus the controversy remains between the two parties. 3 The fact that the City of Fruitland, or
its counsel, produced documents helpful to Mr. Wade's case does not resolve the issue before
this Court. Mr. Wade requested documents and the County, relying on I.C. § 9-335, denied his
request. The District Court ordered the County to produce documents requested by Mr. Wade,
and the County then appealed that order. The District Court stayed the order pending appeal;
that order remains outstanding.
2.

Even if This Case Were Moot, All Three Mootness Exceptions Still Apply.

Under Idaho law, an issue that might otherwise seem moot may be litigated on appeal if
the issue fits within an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Idaho Supreme Court has carved
out three exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
3 The County does note that on January 18,2013, the criminal unit of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office declined prosecution based on these investigatory records.
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(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the
person raising the issue;
(2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is
capable of repetition; and
(3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest.
Ameritel Inns, 141 Idaho at 851-52.

The Court has also suggested a possible fourth exception for cases in which attorney fees
remain an outstanding issue. In Henry v. Taylor, although the issue between the parties had been
resolved, the Court reasoned as follows:
However, it is not moot because Mr. Henry requests an award of attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Code sections 9-344(2), 12-117, and/or 12-121. Since the
requested documents were provided after this lawsuit was instituted to compel
their production, the issue of attorney fees remains an issue to be resolved."
152 Idaho 155, 161 (2012).

a.

Deeming This Appeal as Moot Would Strip Investigatory Records in
the Third Judicial District of Statutory Protection From Disclosure,
and Thus Have Collateral Legal Consequences.

Idaho courts have applied the first exception

the possibility of collateral legal

consequences - primarily in criminal cases. A criminal case will be found moot only if no
collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction. Adams
v. Killeen, 115 Idaho 1034, 1035 (Ct. App. 1989), citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968);
Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469 (1971). Collateral legal consequences are easy to spot in criminal

proceedings. For example, if a defendant has already been released from prison, then appeals
regarding an excessive sentence are moot. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004); citing
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662 (Ct.App. 2000). Appeals about violations of county jail hearing

guidelines also do not fit the collateral legal consequences exception when the jail hearing itself
did not result in the legal consequences, such as a revocation of probation. Adams, 115 Idaho at
1034-35. On the other hand, appeals regarding criminal convictions themselves, even after
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release from custody, may have sufficient collateral consequences to overcome mootness.

Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227.

Although Idaho case law on this mootness exception in civil

proceedings is sparse, the principles remain the same.
In this case, the County faces collateral legal consequences if this Court does not address
the District Court's decision. The District Court's opinion strips investigatory records of their
statutory exemption granted by I.C. § 9-335.

If not corrected or clarified, this opinion will

inform future decisions in the Third Judicial District regarding public records requests for
investigatory records.

b.

Litigation Regarding Public Records Requests for Investigatory
Records of Pending Cases Are Likely To Evade Judicial Review.

The second exception - likelihood of evading judicial review - applies when the
challenged conduct occurs on a typically short, predictable, cyclical time frame. One example of
conduct on such a cyclical time frame would be the promulgation of standards by the Idaho State
Board of Education. See Idaho Schools, 128 Idaho at 283. In the Idaho Schools case, in 1990,
an education association filed a declaratory judgment action against the Idaho State Board of
Education and the Idaho Legislature (hereinafter collectively as "the State) for deficient school
funding. Id. at 279. In 1994, the State filed a motion for declaration of mootness based upon
subsequent action by the Legislature and the State Board of Education.

Id. at 280-281.

Regardless of the legislative changes, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the case fit into
the "likelihood of evading judicial review" exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 283. The
Court reasoned that the State Board could otherwise promulgate new standards every year,
sunset the previous year's standards, and thus evade review. Id. at 283.

See also Am. Lung

Ass'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dept. of Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 546 (2006) (likelihood of
evading judicial review exception applied when petitioner appealed a 2004 determination by the
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Director of the Department of Agriculture, even though the Director later issued a 2005
determination); Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524 (2006) (likelihood of evading judicial review
exception applied to visitation right issues, even though visitation rights in question were no
longer at issue because child's father returned from Iraq, because father was still a member of
National Guard, and thus those visitation rights could again become an issue).
When the challenged conduct is not typically short, predictable, or cyclical in nature, the
Court is reluctant to grant the "likelihood of evasion" exception to the mootness doctrine. In
Koch v. Canyon County, taxpayers challenged, under the state constitution, a lease agreement

that Canyon County had entered into.

145 Idaho 158, 160 (2008).

By the time the Idaho

Supreme Court ruled on the case, the county commissioners had already purchased and resold
the property. Id. In denying an exception to the mootness doctrine, the Court reasoned that the
challenged conduct was unlikely to evade judicial review in the future because taxpayers now
had standing to challenge this conduct. Id. at 163. In contrast to standards that can be and are
regularly modified within a relatively short time frame, government agencies do not buy and
subsequently sell property as a typical matter, and thus taxpayers can expect to be able to
challenge future purchases of property without the issue becoming moot. Similarly in Freeman
v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, the Court determined that the "likelihood of evasion" exception did
not apply.

In Freeman, a prisoner threatened to sue a prison guard and was subsequently

disciplined for the threat.

138 Idaho 872, 874 (Ct.App. 2003).

After an unsuccessful

administrative appeal, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging free speech violations.
Id. at 874-75. His petition was dismissed. Id. By the time the Court of Appeals ruled in this

case, the prisoner was already released from prison. Id. at 876. The Court noted that cases of
this kind do not necessarily evade review because the Ninth Circuit had just recently ruled on an
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Idaho prisoner's First Amendment challenge in Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.

This public records case with Mr. Wade fits squarely within this second exception to the
mootness doctrine. The very nature of criminal investigations renders them short, predictable,
and cyclical. As a matter of course, police officers gather evidence, prosecutors review the case,
and then either file criminal charges or decline prosecution. If charges are filed, the case goes
through the court system until the case is adjudicated. Because of an investigation's short-lived
lifespan, public records litigation over the investigatory records of a pending investigation will
inevitably become moot by appellate court review. In that way, this case more closely resembles
the Idaho Schools, American Lung, and Webb cases than the Koch or Freeman cases. Similar to
Idaho Schools and American Lung, in which standards or determinations were renewed, thus

rendering previous versions moot, investigations predictably run their course and then are closed,
only to be replaced by new investigations. The fact that the County made a charging decision or
that Mr. Wade obtained the documents from other parties through civil discovery demonstrates
how eventually, once a charging decision is made or a civil lawsuit is filed, the investigatory
records often become available for disclosure.

c.

The Confidentiality of Investigatory Records Under Prosecutorial
Review Is of Substantial Public Interest and Is a Matter of First
Impression.

The third exception allows the Court to address an otherwise moot issue if it is one of
substantial public interest to provide for future direction and guidance. Idaho Schools, 128 Idaho
at 284, citing Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490,492 (1994). In Idaho
Schools, the Court determined that even though the regulations at issue had sunsetted, the

constitutional issues regarding state funding levels were important enough to fit under this third
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exception. 128 Idaho at 284. Similarly, in Johnson, the issue was whether a trial court had the
power to grant injunctive relief to prevent a biased decision-maker from conducting a due
process hearing. 126 Idaho at 490. Although the hearing had already been held by the time the
Court ruled on the issue, the Court nevertheless determined that this issue had substantial public
interest and thus granted review. Id. at 490-491. The fact that the hearing had already occurred
did not prevent the Court from taking on the issue because of the importance of local school
boards. Id. at 493.
The Court has narrowly construed the "substantial public interest" exception.

This

exception typically does not apply if the Court has already decided the issue in a previous case.

See Miller v. Bd. of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 246 (1998); Johnson, 126 Idaho at 490-491; School
Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Ed. Ass'n, 98 Idaho 486,488 (1977). In Miller, the
Court declined to apply the "substantial public interest" exception because the Johnson Court
had previously ruled on the issue. Id. In Johnson, the Court stated that it chose to review the
otherwise moot case "because the question is one of first impression in this Court and because of
substantial public interest in the question." Id. at 490. The third exception also may not apply if
the Court believes that the issue will not evade judicial review. See Freeman, 138 Idaho at 877.
In the Freeman case, the Court determined that although the alleged constitutional violations
could be of substantial public interest, "the number of such claims that reach the courts render it
unlikely that recurrences of denied meaningful court access will escape judicial review." Id.
The public records issues in this case are of substantial public interest and are matters of
first impression,4 and thus fit the third mootness exception. A question at the crux of this case is
whether an investigatory record is deemed to be "inactive" during prosecutorial review. The

Refer to the diagram in the County's brief indicating the lack ofIdaho case law on point for this question.
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District Court's initial decision indicated that prosecutorial review did not keep an investigation
"active."

Another question in this case is whether I.C. § 9-335(1 )(a) through (f) requires

factually certain interference "with enforcement proceedings" (hereinafter "interfere" or
"interference") or deprivation "of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication" (hereinafter
"deprive" or "deprivation") to justify exemption of investigatory records from disclosure.
Furthermore, this case also raises the question of whether the County was correct in applying an
objective standard - without looking to the specifics of the case or Mr. Wade - in denying the
public records request. This Court has never directly addressed any of these questions, so these
issues are of first impression in Idaho. Furthermore, answers to these questions have severe
consequences across this state for law enforcement agencies (which includes prosecutors)
handling public records requests for investigatory records that await a charging decision or
adjudication in the courts. See Amicus Brief, pp. 16-19. A ruling that investigatory records
pending a charging decision are subject to disclosure would open the floodgates for public
records requests by individuals that suspect that law enforcement is investigating their potentially
illegal conduct.

Depending on the contents of these investigatory records, these individuals

could modify their behavior and conduct, and even flee the jurisdiction.
B.

MISTAKE OF LAW

The second category of issues that this Court faces is whether the District Court erred as a
matter of law when it determined that investigatory records pending prosecutorial review should
be disclosed to Mr. Wade. The County contends that the District Court is in error as a matter of
law because (1) prosecutorial review does not render an investigation "inactive;" (2) even
inactive investigatory records can be exempt from disclosure; (3) the law does not require
factually certain interference in each specific case to justify withholding investigatory records;
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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and (4) the PRA requires objective treatment of requestors, without looking to the reasons for the
records requests.
1.

Prosecutorial Review Does Not Render an Investigation Inactive.

It is well settled that prosecutors are "law enforcement" for purposes of the PRA.

The relevant statute states as follows:
As used herein, the term "law enforcement agency" means the office of the
attorney general, the office of the state controller, the Idaho state police, the office
of any prosecuting attorney, sheriff or municipal police department.
I.C. § 9-335; see also Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796 (2002).

(Recognizing that

prosecutors are law enforcement under the PRA.) Furthermore, the proposition that the work of
the prosecutor is to enforce the law, and therefore its work is subsumed in the definition of law
enforcement, has long been established. In I.C. § 31-2227, the statutes state as follows:
Irrespective of police powers vested by statute in state, county, and municipal
officers, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state ofldaho that the primary
duty of enforcing all the penal provisions of any and all statutes of this state, in
any court, is vested in the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of each of the several
counties. When in the judgment of such county officers, they need assistance from
municipal peace officers within the county, they are authorized and directed to
call for such and such local officers shall render such assistance ....
See also Newman v. Lance, 129 Idaho 98, 103 (1996). (Court stating that "The legislature has
made it the primary obligation of the prosecutor to enforce the state penal laws." [Emphasis
added.])
The fact that investigatory records are under prosecutorial review for a charging decision
does not render an investigation "inactive."s As argued in the County's previous brief, no Idaho
statute or case law "has defined 'active' or 'inactive' investigation." As far as a prosecutor is
The County would point out that prosecutorial review could entail follow-up investigation, and thus arguably could
even be an investigation itself. If follow-up "investigation" by the prosecutor removes the "inactive" status from an
investigation, then cases under prosecutorial review are not necessarily "inactive." Furthermore, prosecutorial
review could also constitute an "enforcement proceeding," as contemplated by I.C. § 9-335(l)(a), that premature
disclosure would interfere with.
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5

concerned, as long as the prosecutor is trying to make a charging decision, the case is still
"active."

Furthermore, when a prosecutor reviews a case, the prosecutor can decline

prosecution, file criminal charges, or request further investigation.

A determination that

prosecutorial review renders a case "inactive" therefore is not rooted in any Idaho law, and does
not contemplate the possibility that further investigation, by request of the prosecutor, may still
occur.
Prosecutorial review6 should not be short-circuited by the early disclosure of
investigatory records. The County argues that this is exactly the sort of interference that the
Legislature sought to avoid in adopting I.C. § 9-335, and that this Court clarified in the line of
cases interpreting the PRA, culminating in Bolger and Gibson. As a prosecuting agency, the
County suggests to the Court that any investigatory record under prosecutorial review be deemed
"active" or at least protected from disclosure under I.e. § 9-335.
While the District Court later backed away from its initial decision that the investigation
was inactive (R. p. 100), the District Court's misunderstanding of the statute and the role of the
prosecutor remained in each revision of its order. The District Court failed to recognize that
prosecutorial review of law enforcement records, prior to charging or declining a case, does not
necessarily render an investigation "inactive." The District Court's initial opinion stated the
following:
It appears from the Court's review of the documents that the last active
investigation into this incident was on January 19, 2012 when Idaho State Police
Detective Ken White interviewed the manager of the Reel Theater and collected a
CD entitled "Video from Reel Theatre."

Another way the Court could rule is to include "prosecutorial review" as a type of investigation.
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(R. p. 52).7 The District Court thus effectively ignored the affidavits of the County's Chief
Criminal Deputy, the County's Investigator, and the Chief Deputy of the Canyon County
Sheriffs office. Investigator Bill Crawford provided an affidavit to the Court dated June 6,
2012, indicating that he had been tasked on Mach 15, 2012 "to review the officer involved
shooting for criminal charges ... " (R. p. 60). Chief Gary Deulen provided an affidavit to the
court stating, in relevant part, that the Chief Criminal Deputy contacted him "to review an officer
involved shooting for criminal charges on or about April 1, 2012." (R. p. 59). Finally, Chief
Criminal Deputy Chris Topmiller provided the Court with an affidavit explaining that he had
been tasked with a review of the officer involved shooting on or about February 14,2012. (R. p.
57).

Investigator Crawford, Chief Deulen and Prosecutor Topmiller were all actively

participating in "prosecutorial review."

The District Court pointed to no law supporting its

initial determination that the investigation, then under prosecutorial review, was inactive.

2.

Inactive Investigatory Records Pending Prosecutorial Review Are Still
Exempt From Disclosure.

In certain circumstances, inactive investigatory records are still exempt from disclosure.
Under I.C. § 9-335(3), public agencies must disclose an inactive investigatory record "unless the
disclosure would violate the provisions of subsection (l)(a) through (f) of this section." The
concerns listed in I.C. § 9-335(l)(a) through (f) therefore still become applicable when
determining whether disclosure is appropriate for inactive investigations. As long as disclosure
of those investigatory records would result in any of the I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns,
then the prosecutor must not disclose the investigatory records. This Court has, in fact, already
found an instance in which investigatory records of a case, in which the charging decision had

7 This observation by the District Court also fails to recognize that a prosecuting attorney's work in screening and
reviewing a case could potentially be part of an "investigation" as contemplated by the PRA.
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been made, were still exempt from disclosure. Gibson, 138 Idaho at 790-791 (investigatory
records were exempt from disclosure, even after conflict counsel reviewed the records and
determined that criminal charges were not appropriate); see also Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21 for
further discussion regarding Gibson.
Even if the investigation were inactive at the time of the District Court's decision,s the
investigatory records regarding Mr. Wade were still exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 9335(3). The County had yet to make a charging decision, and therefore denied Mr. Wade's
records request.

Strictly applying the Gibson result to this case would allow for these

investigatory records to be exempt from disclosure even after the County declined to file
criminal charges in this case. For the County to therefore refuse to disclose the records until
after making its charging decisions falls well within the exemption from disclosure granted by
the Gibson Court.
3.

Idaho Courts Do Not Require Absolutely Certain Interference or
Deprivation To Withhold Investigatory Records.

The PRA does not require absolute certainty that disclosure of investigatory records
would result in adverse effects. Along with four other scenarios, the statute at I.C. § 9-335
exempts investigatory records from disclosure if production of such records would interfere and
deprive. The statutory language alone seems to require certain interference or certain deprivation
to justify refusals of requests for investigatory records.

Requiring such a literal adherence

would, however, prevent law enforcement agencies from maintaining confidentiality of most, if
not all, of its investigatory records, even those for pending cases.
In any investigation, law enforcement can never precisely gauge the likelihood that a
requestor of public records will use information to interfere or deprive. To require an absolutely
8 This is not a concession, but merely for the sake of argument.
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certain factual determination of interference or deprivation to justify each denial of a public
records request would be impossible, and thus lead to an absurd result. This Court stated that
"[t]he court, in construing a statute, should aim to give it a sensible construction, such as will
effectuate the legislative intent, and, if possible, avoid an absurd conclusion." Safe Air For

Everyone v. Idaho State Dept. of Agric., 145 Idaho 164, 166 (2008). Therefore, the District
Court's reading of the statute I.C. § 9-335(1), which required absolute certainty of interference or
deprivation, is not the most sensible construction or the most accurate reflection of the legislative
intent, and cannot be the proper meaning.
Idaho courts have not clarified whether a factual determination of absolutely certain
interference or deprivation is required to deny a public records request for investigatory records.
In Gibson v. Ada County, a district court reviewed the investigatory records of a case after the
determination that no criminal charges were to be filed.

138 Idaho at 789. Because of that

determination, the charging decision was made, and the case was closed. Despite the status of
the case, the district court affirmed Ada County's refusal to disclose the investigatory records.
The district court's opinion did not elaborate on the factors leading to its decision, but merely
noted that it had conducted an in camera review, and was convinced that the documents were
exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 9-335 and § 9-340B. Gibson v. Ada County, CV OC2594
(Jan 30, 2001, District Court Judge Thomas Neville). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court did
not have the relevant documents before it, and affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that
the decision was not clearly erroneous. 138 Idaho at 790.
Though concise in its analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court hints that certain interference or
deprivation is not required. In Bolger v. Lance, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Attorney
General's investigatory records and determined that the documents would "clearly 'interfere with
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law enforcement proceedings' or 'disclose investigative techniques and procedures.'" 137 Idaho
at 796. The Court, therefore, did not provide any guidance regarding the degree of certainty that
law enforcement agencies must have regarding the I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns. If
anything, the Bolger Court suggested that a factual determination of certain interference was not
required. In relevant part, the Court stated as follows:
Additionally, our review of the documents and the record reveals that disclosure
of the documents would clearly "interfere with law enforcement proceedings" or
"disclose investigative techniques and procedures." I.C. § 9-335.
137 Idaho at 796. (Emphasis added). By using the word "or" between the two reasons for
exemption from disclosure, the Bolger Court suggested that neither result was factually
absolutely certain to happen. If certainty of those results was critical to justify a disclosure
decision, presumably, the Court would have so stated. Furthermore, if the Court's review of the
documents showed a factual certainty of both of those results, then the Court would have used
the word "and" in between the two reasons. Instead, the Court indicated that either result could
plausibly occur, and therefore affirmed the Attorney General's decision to withhold the records.
Id.

As laid out in the County's previous brief, the legislative history of the Idaho PRA shows
a clear overarching intent to shield law enforcement investigatory records from disclosure. The
Legislature's statement of purpose set forth exceptions to the general exemption from disclosure
granted for investigatory records.

R.S. 12005 C3, 1986 House Statements of Purpose.

Specifically, the Legislature wished that such records would be available to involved parties,
their authorized representatives, and their insurers, but only to the extent that such disclosure
would not endanger witnesses, prevent successful completion of criminal investigations, and
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damage personal reputations. Jd. The stated general policy in favor of exempting investigatory
records from disclosure noted nothing regarding the certainty of these adverse effects.
In analyzing identical language contained in a previous version of the federal Freedom of
Information Act, the United States Supreme Court condoned generalized denials of public
records requests for investigatory records during the pendency of cases. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,214-15 (1978).9 The Robbins Court determined that the National

Labor Relations Board did not have to disclose witness statements prior to its hearing. Jd. at 236.
In considering the statutory language "would interfere with enforcement proceedings," the
Robbins Court articulated that this exemption was not to be applied and determined "on an

individual, case-by-case basis." Jd. at 214. The Robbins Court determined that "Congress did not
intend to prevent federal courts from determining that, with respect to particular kinds of
enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is
pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.'" Jd. at 214-15.
Public policy concerns of consistency lean strongly in favor of not requiring factual
determinations regarding the certainty of interference or deprivation.

If law enforcement

agencies could exempt from disclosure only the investigatory records that are certain to cause
one of the

I.e.

§ 9-335(1)(a) through (f) problems, then law enforcement would not be able to

exempt most, if any, of its records. To make such factual determinations, law enforcement
agencies would have to scrutinize the known information about the requestor as well as the
details of the case, and then make request-by-request determinations on whether to disclose the
record or not. For purposes of public records, however, law enforcement agencies are expressly
forbidden to conduct such scrutiny - the PRA specifically prohibits this analysis. See

I.e.

§ 9-

As discussed in the County's brief, the Idaho PRA adopted the language of the federal Freedom ofInforrnation Act
in 1986, after the Robbins decision.
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338. The policy and spirit behind the PRA require an objective standard that exempts from
disclosure the investigatory records of pending cases, and is consistent across requestors.
In this case, the District Court misunderstood the standard the County was required to
apply before denying Mr. Wade's request for documents under the PRA. The District Court
stated in its second Memorandum and Decision:
It is this Court's opinion that the statute clearly sets forth a requirement that
disclosure of the relevant documents, to be exempt, must interfere with
enforcement proceedings and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication.

(R. p. 101). (Emphasis added). As evident in its decision, the District Court required the County
to prove, with absolute certainty, that disclosure of the investigatory records in Mr. Wade's case
specifically would interfere and deprive. The District Court therefore used reasoning that the
United States Supreme Court in the Robbins decision flatly rejected.
The County does not have to prove specifically how disclosure of investigatory records in
Mr. Wade's case would, without fail, interfere and deprive.

As explained above, such a

construction of the PRA would lead to absurd results. The Idaho Supreme Court has never
clarified that issue. The Robbins decision, and, to a lesser extent, the Bolger decision, both show
that absolute certainty of interference is not necessary. Based on its experience, the County
knew that such premature disclosure of investigatory records in criminal cases, in general, would
lead to I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns. Therefore, the District Court's focus on the fact
that the County did not fully articulate all individualized concerns regarding disclosure of
records in Mr. Wade's specific case was misplaced. The County properly relied on an objective
standard that it could apply neutrally and consistently across all public records requestors, and
properly denied Mr. Wade's request accordingly.
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4.

The Public Records Act Requires Objective - Not Subjective - Treatment of
All Requests, and Does Not Allow For Different Treatment of Requestors
Based on the Reasons For the Requests.

The PRA requires treating all requestors equally. The definition of "public record" listed
in I.C. § 9-337(13) is not contingent on the identity of the requestor or the validity of the
requestor's reasons for wanting the record. As a general rule, records that are "public" for one
requestor are therefore statutorily "public" for another. To ensure that the public had equal
access to public records, the Legislature included I.C. § 9-335(5), which states as follows:
The custodian shall make no inquiry of any person who requests a public record,
except:
(a) To verify the identity of the requester in accordance with section 9-342, Idaho
Code; or
(b) To ensure that the requested record or information will not be used for
purposes of a mailing or telephone list prohibited by section 9-348, Idaho Code,
or as otherwise provided by law; or
(c) As required for purposes of protecting personal information from disclosure
under chapter 2, title 49, Idaho Code, and federal law.
I.e. § 9-335(5). The custodian cannot ask the requestor why the requestor wants the information
- the custodian can only ensure that the information will not be used for mailing or telephone
lists. I.C. § 9-338(5). Public agencies cannot grant records to some but not to others. Public
agencies cannot change the "public" status of a record because of the validity of the requestor's
reasons for wanting the information.
The only time requestors may receIve slightly different access to records is when
requestors request information regarding themselves.

Under I.C. § 9-342(1), a person may

inspect records regarding himself. This right, however, is limited by I.C. § 9-342(3)(a) which
does not allow individuals to review "[o]therwise exempt investigatory records of a public
agency or independent public body corporate and politic if the investigation is ongoing." I.C. §
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9-342(3)(a). Furthermore, in the Gibson decision, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that I.C. § 9335 controls over I.e. § 9-342(1). 138 Idaho at 790.
Under the PRA, the County cannot treat Mr. Wade any differently than any other
requestor. Under both I.C. § 9-342(1) and the Gibson decision, Mr. Wade is not entitled to these
records even though the records pertain to himself. Mr. Wade stands in the position of any
requestor, and is treated no differently. Therefore, Mr. Wade was not entitled to those records.
The validity of his reasons for wanting the investigatory records cannot factor into the County's
decision to grant or refuse disclosure of the investigatory records - I.C. § 9-338 precludes the
County from considering his reasons. Even though Mr. Wade's reasons appeared dire "enough"
for the District Court, the PRA does not allow for differential treatment of Mr. Wade. 10
Therefore, under the PRA, disclosing the investigatory records to Mr. Wade specifically but to
no other parties is fundamentally flawed and reflects a misunderstanding of public records law.
The District Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum and Decision makes clear that the
District Court applied a subjective standard when it ordered the disclosure of the records
requested by Mr. Wade. The District Court spent considerable time analyzing Idaho tort law (an
irrelevant and incorrect factor to consider when making public records decisions) and Mr.
Wade's interest in obtaining the record (another irrelevant and incorrect factor), and then
reasoned as follows:
Under the facts known to the Petitioner at this time, he can effectively submit a
tort claim; however, his ability to pursue this claim will be hindered unless given
access to the requested documents.

10 In its order, the District Court limited disclosure to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel only. See R. p. 102.
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(R. p. 51). It is clear from a review of the decision that the District Court engaged in a balancing

test of the County's interest in excluding the documents under I.C. § 9-335, and Mr. Wade's
interests in filing a tort claim under I.e. § 6-907.
The PRA does not allow for such a balancing test.

As stated supra, the County is

required by the act to objectively review the request and not go beyond the most basic
information provided in the petition to determine whether disclosure is proper. The District
Court's decision to weigh Mr. Wade's individual need and then find that the County improperly
denied Mr. Wade's request is not supported by the law and is unfair to an agency making an
objective determination under I.C. § 9-338.
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES

The statute at I.C. § 9-344(2) allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if
"the request or refusal to provide records was frivolously pursued." I I (Emphasis added.). No
other statute regarding attorney fees applies to this public records case. In Henry v. Taylor, a
case litigated over a public records request, the Court reasoned as follows:
Idaho Code section 9-344(2) sets forth the standard for awarding reasonable costs
and attorney fees in actions pursuant to the Public Records Act. To base an award
on some other statute would be contrary to the legislature's intent in including in
the Act an attorney fee provision with a specified standard for awarding attorney
fees in proceedings to enforce compliance with the Act. That statute is the
exclusive basis for such an award. Therefore, Idaho Code sections 12-117 and
12-121 do not apply.
Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 155, 162 (2012).

Examining the Court's decisions in the context of attorney fees in public records
litigation suggests that, at minimum, proving that a refusal to provide records was "frivolously
pursued" requires the satisfaction of four requirements. First, the public agency must possess or
II According to Black's Law Dictionary, "frivolous" means "Lacking a legal basis or legal merit, not serious; not
reasonably purposeful." FRIVOLOUS, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
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have access to the writing. See I.C. § 9-337(3); Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State
Dept. of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 369-370 (2006). Second, the writing must be a public record.
See I.C. § 9-337(13), (16). Third, the public record cannot be subject to any statutory exemption.
See I.C. § 9-338(1); Idaho Conservation, 143 Idaho at 371 (" ... these Nutrition Management

Plans qualify as public records for which there is no statutory exemption."); Henry, 152 Idaho at
161 ("There is no contention that any of the records requested were exempt from disclosure ... ").
Fourth, the public agency must deny the request for the public record. See Idaho Conservation,
143 Idaho at 367; Henry, 152 Idaho at 157-158.
The necessity of all four of these requirements to prove frivolous pursuit is apparent in
Idaho case law. In Idaho Conservation, the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (hereinafter
"ISDA") received a public records request from the Idaho Conservation League (hereinafter
"ICL") for the Nutrition Management Plans (hereinafter "NMPs") of four specific feedlots. Two
of those NMPs were specifically exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 22-2718(4)(f). The other
two NMPs were not exempt under any statute. Furthermore, the newly passed statute I.C. § 224906 did not require the ISDA to retain copies of NMPs, but gave ISDA the statutory right to
request NMPs from feedlots. 143 Idaho at 367. ISDA denied ICL's public records request for
all four NMPs. The Court ruled in ICL's favor regarding ISDA's refusal to disclose the two
NMPs that were not exempt from disclosure by statute. Id. at 369-370. ISDA satisfied the first
requirement because it had a statutory right to demand access to the NMPs from private feedlots.
Both parties agreed that the NMPs were public records, thus satisfying the second requirement.
No statutory exemption applied (third requirement), and ISDA denied the request anyway (fourth
requirement). Accordingly, the Court granted attorney fees to ICL. See id. at 370.
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The necessity of these four requirements to show frivolous pursuit is again apparent in
the Henry case. In refusing to award attorney fees, the Henry Court determined that the newly
appointed prosecuting attorney did not frivolously fail to produce the former prosecuting
attorney's bank statements at issue. 152 Idaho at 163. Although requirement three (the writing
was not subject to any statutory exemption) and requirement four (the prosecuting attorney
denied the request) were satisfied, the Henry Court questioned the satisfaction of requirement
one (whether the new prosecuting attorney possessed or had access to the previous prosecuting
attorney's bank statements), and requirement two (whether the writing was a public record). Id.
at 162-163.
The statute which controls the attorney fees issue in Mr. Wade's case is I.C. § 9-344(2).
The Henry decision made apparent that the only applicable attorney fees statute in this context is
the PRA statute, and thus Mr. Wade's request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is mistaken.
Just as in the Henry case, the dispute here is over a public records disclosure decision. The PRA
provides its own specific attorney fees statute which governs awards of attorney fees for disputes
regarding these matters. Therefore, the question is whether the County frivolously pursued the
appeal.
The County did not frivolously pursue this appeal.

According to the "frivolously

pursued" requirements set forth above, the County did satisfy the first requirement (the County
possessed or had access to the documents), the second requirement (the documents were public
records), and the fourth requirement (the County denied the public records request). The third
requirement - the lack of any applicable statutory exemption from disclosure - however, remains
to be satisfied. This case is therefore closely analogous to the Idaho Conservation case, but this
time, the County relied on a statutory exemption - I.C. § 9-335 - which applies to investigatory
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records. In the Idaho Conservation case, the lack of a statutory exemption for the records was
not in question - ISDA was merely contesting that it was no longer a "custodian" of the
documents. In contrast, the County is pointing to a statutory exemption in I.C. § 9-335, and is
seeking clarification. Because the Court has not directly addressed whether investigatory records
under prosecutorial review are exempt from disclosure, this case is one of first impression in
Idaho. The County relied in good faith in I.C. § 9-335, the holdings in Bolger and Gibson, and
thus did not act frivolously in denying Mr. Wade's public records request. For these reasons,
Mr. Wade's request for attorney fees must be denied.

v.

CONCLUSION

The County therefore respectfully asks this Court to reverse the District Court's decision,
clarify the PRA statutes and case law, provide direction for law enforcement agencies
(specifically, prosecuting attorneys) handling public records requests, and deny Mr. Wade's
request for attorney fees.
DATED: February 21,2013.
BRYANF. TAYLOR
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney

By:
Michael K. Porter
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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